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EQUALITY, OBJECTIVITY, AND
NEUTRALITY
Alafair S. Burke*
MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE
CRIMINAL COURTROOM. By Cynthia Lee. New York: New York

University Press. 2003. Pp. 371 . $45.00.

INTRODUCTION

When is homicide reasonable? That familiar, yet unanswered
question continues to intrigue both courts and criminal law scholars, in
large part because any response must first address the question,
"reasonable to whom?"
The standard story about why that threshold question is both
difficult and interesting usually involves a juxtaposition of "objective"
and "subjective" standards for judging claims of reasonableness.1 On
the one hand, the story goes, is a "subjective" standard of
reasonableness under which jurors evaluate the reasonableness of a
criminal defendant's beliefs and actions by comparing them to those of
a hypothetical reasonable person sharing all of the individual
defendant's character traits.2 This standard is commonly invoked to
* Associate Professor, Hofstra University School of Law. B.A. 1991, Reed College; J.D.
1994, Stanford. - Ed. I would like to thank Robin Charlow and Joanna Grossman for their
helpful comments on previous drafts. I am grateful to Cynthia Leigh, Reference Librarian of
the Hofstra Law Library, and to Daniel Vendetti and Gretchen Rauch for their dedicated
research assistance

1. See generally Jody D. Armour, Race lpsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent
Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781 (1994); Kevin Jon Heller,
Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but Critical Assessment of the Use of Subjective
Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provocation Cases, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1
(1998); Mark Kelman, Reasonable Evidence of Reasonableness, 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 798
(1991); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Concept of
Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1996); Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self
Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379,
409-13 (1991); V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235 (2001)
[hereinafter Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity]; Kenneth W. Simons, Self-Defense, Mens
Rea, and Bernhard Goetz, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1179 (1989) (book review).
2. See Maguigan, supr'ti note 1, at 409 n.105 (noting that one use of the term "subjective"
is to describe a reasonableness standard that places "the hypothetical reasonable person in
the situation of and having the information available to and the experience and perceptions
of the defendant on trial"); Nourse, supra note 1, at 1278-79 (describing the "subjectivized"
approach to self-defense as permitting jurors and courts to understand the individual
defendant's experiences).
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support the self-defense claims of women who have killed men who
have severely and repeatedly abused them. The appropriate model for
assessing reasonableness in such cases, the subjectivists argue, is not
the reasonable man, or even reasonable person, but rather, the
hypothetical "reasonable battered woman. "3 In contrast, opponents of
a qualified standard of reasonableness maintain that criminal law must
return to its "objectivity." Otherwise, the argument goes, defendants
invoking syndromes and "abuse excuses" - most notably the battered
woman "poster child" 4 - will literally get away with murder. 5
In Murder and the Reasonable Man: Passion and Fear in the
Criminal Courtroom, Cynthia Lee 6 adds a new dimension to this
traditional dichotomy by suggesting that it is not battered women but,
rather, members of the traditional "majority culture" - white,
heterosexual men7 - who are most able to manipulate the concept of
reasonableness by invoking dominant cultural norms. In a book
directed as much to lay readers and courts as to a traditional academic
audience, Lee weaves together a troubling and compelling array of
case narratives to demonstrate how majority culture defendants are
able to benefit from jurors' deeply ingrained biases.
Drawing from three categories of cases in both the self-defense
and provocation contexts, Lee tells the story of a criminal justice
system in which it is reasonable for a man to strangle his unfaithful

3. See, e.g., Ibo-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634 (D.C. App. 1979) (holding
that expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome would help the jury determine
the reasonableness of defendant's beliefs); Smith v. State, 486 S.E.2d 819, 823 (Ga. 1997)
(holding that evidence relating to battered woman syndrome was admissible to help the
defendant show that her beliefs were reasonable from the perspective "of a reasonable
person possessing the same or similar psychological and physical characteristics as the
defendant"); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 377 (N.J. 1984) (holding that expert testimony
regarding battered woman syndrome would help the jury determine the reasonableness of
defendant's beliefs); State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ohio 1990) (same); State v. Kelly,
685 P.2d 564, 570 (Wash. 1984) (same).
4. See Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, supra note 1, at 1235 (noting that "[t)he
poster child [of subjective defenses), and even the alleged cause of this development, is the
battered woman").
5. See ALAN. M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER COP-OUTS, SOB
STORIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 15-25 (1994) (arguing that some claims of
battered women could be seen as "abuse excuses"); JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT:
DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE THREATEN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM?(63 (1997) (citing the self
defense claims of battered women as an example of overly subjective defenses).
6. Professor of Law, George Washington University.
7. Lee uses the term "majority culture defendants" to describe the male, white, and
heterosexual defendants she discusses. See p. 277. Although white male heterosexuals are
not a statistical majority, I nevertheless retain her use of that term, because Lee's argument
is that these actors, although not a majority, benefit from cultural norms shared by the
majority.
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wife with a telephone cord,8 for a heterosexual man to beat a
retreating gay man to death for the kind of unwanted sexual advance
that most women find commonplace,9 and for a white homeowner to
shoot a Japanese exchange student looking for a Halloween party.1 0
Why, Lee asks, are jurors so willing to see fear and passion as
"reasonable" when triggered in men by female infidelity, in
heterosexuals by perceived homosexual advances, and in white
defendants by perceived threats from people of color? They see
reasonableness in these cases, she answers, because they share
unspoken biases that render male jealousy, heterosexual
protectiveness, and white fears of people of color understandable.
Because of the role of reasonableness in the law of criminal defenses,
Lee argues, juror reliance on biased social norms permits majority
culture defendants to claim self-defense and provocation more
successfully than nonmajority defendants in these three categories of
cases: men who kill because of female infidelity; "gay panic" cases;
and "racialized fear" cases.11
Lee's reassessment of the reasonableness requirement launches
primarily from her concern about this inequity. She then lays the
groundwork for "a conception of reasonableness deeper than the
prevailing one" (p. 13) by offering three "tentative" (p. 11)
recommendations for "theoretical, practical, and doctrinal reform" (p.
11). First, she argues that jurors should be required to apply a
normative concept of reasonableness in addition to what she refers to
as a "positivist" one (pp. 235-45). Under this normative standard,
jurors would focus not only on the empirical question of what most
individuals might have believed or done in the defendant's situation,
but also on the normative inquiry of what an individual ought to have
believed or done (p. 235). Second, she maintains that jurors should
evaluate the reasonableness of not only the defendant's beliefs, but
also his actions (pp. 260-75). In other words, in provocation and self
defense cases, jurors should consider not only whether a reasonable
person would have been impassioned or fearful, respectively, but also
whether a reasonable person would have acted in response to those
emotions as the defendant did. Finally, and most interestingly, Lee
8. P. 17 (summarizing the facts of People v. Berry, 18 Cal.3d 509 (1976), in which the
California Supreme Court held that the male defendant was entitled to a jury instruction
regarding the defense of extreme emotional distress).
9. Pp. 85-86 (summarizing the facts of People v. Mangum, 260 Ill. App. 3d 631 (1994), in
which the defendant was partially successful in claiming that the victim's unwanted sexual
advance triggered a heat of passion that rendered him unable to cease the subsequent
beating).
10. Pp. 167-69 (summarizing the facts of Hattori v. Peairs, 662 So.2d 509, 515 (La. Ct.
App. 1995), a civil case against a Louisiana homeowner who was acquitted of manslaughter
charges on the basis of self-defense).
11. See pp. 17-45, 67-95, and 137-74.
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encourages a trial practice of "switching," in which jurors would be
asked to switch the races, genders, and sexual orientations of the
parties involved in the case in order to expose any hidden biases.
This review analyzes Lee's recommendations in three parts, using a
lens of existing law to tease out the old from the new, and using
broader debates in the current criminal law scholarship to frame Lee's
work. In Section I, I argue that Lee's call for a normative standard of
reasonableness, standing alone, is largely a discursive shift in the
standard, not a change to current doctrine. In Section II, I discuss
Lee's recommendation that jurors evaluate the reasonableness of both
the defendant's beliefs and his conduct. Situating her analysis within
the broader literature on criminal defenses, I recharacterize her
suggestion for an inquiry into "act reasonableness" as a call for
criminal defenses defined by flexible standards, rather than by
imperfect rules intended to reflect those standards. In Section III, I
tum to Lee's suggestion of using "switching" and attempt to interpret
it within the broader dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity. I
argue that the practice could be used to create an objective standard
of reasonableness in which jurors evaluating reasonableness compare
the defendant to a hypothetical "neutral" reasonable person, without
gender, race, or sexual orientation.
I.

REASONABLENESS: N ORMATIVE V. EMPIRICAL CONCEPTIONS

The first of Lee's recommendations is that jurors employ both
normative and what she refers to as positivist notions of
reasonableness when evaluating a defendant's claim of self-defense or
provocation (pp. 243-46). In this Section, I suggest that instructing
jurors to apply a normative concept of reasonableness in self-defense
and provocation cases is unlikely, standing alone, to affect verdict
results. Accordingly, Lee's suggestion is best viewed as a discursive
shift in the understanding of reasonableness rather than a doctrinal
reform that is likely to assuage her equality concerns in female
infidelity, gay panic, and racialized-fear cases.
A. Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provocation Law
Evaluating Lee's call for reform in the standard of reasonableness
first requires a brief overview of the role that reasonableness plays in
the law of criminal defenses.12 In most jurisdictions, self-defense is
justified if the defendant reasonably believed that the force was
necessary to prevent an imminent threat of unlawful physical force.
12. Both of the defenses Lee chooses to study, self-defense and provocation, apply only
when the defendant is deemed to be reasonable. In contrast, some criminal defenses, such as
insanity or mental defect, apply precisely because the defendant is not reasonable.
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Accordingly, jurors must determine not only whether the defendant
actually believed that his force was necessary, but also whether that
belief was reasonable.13 Jurors will evaluate the defendant's
reasonableness again in applying the requirement of proportionality,
which provides that the defensive actor's force must be reasonable in
relation to the harm avoided.1 4 Moreover, some jurisdictions impose a
duty to retreat, requiring the self-defender to pursue reasonable
opportunities to retreat safely from the threatened unlawful force.1 5
Provocation law also involves an inquiry into the defendant's
reasonableness by requiring that the alleged provocation be sufficient
to trigger a heat of passion not only in the defendant, but also in the
reasonable person.1 6 Most jurisdictions also impose a cooling-off
requirement, providing not only that the defendant must have killed
before cooling off from the provocation, but also that a reasonable
person would not have cooled off by the time of the killing.1 7
Lee maintains that current defense law uses a purely positivist or
what I would call an empirical notion of reasonableness, asking jurors
to decide what a typical person would have believed, felt, or done in
the defendant's circumstances (pp. 243-44). Under an empirical
standard, jurors define the reasonable person as a "typical" person,
similar statistically to most other people. For example, in a self
defense case, jurors would determine whether a typical person in
the defendant's circumstances would have perceived a threat of
imminent harm. In a case involving provocation, the jury would ask
whether the provoking circumstances would trigger a heat of passion
in the typical person.
Lee asserts two separate arguments for rejecting empirical
typicality as the sole measure of reasonableness. First, jurors may be
inaccurate in their assessments of empirical reasonableness, because
diverse communities might hold widely divergent views about what is
reasonable.18 Second, what a majority of society sees as reasonable
may be viewed historically as unjust, as, for example, slavery or
internment camps.19 Accordingly, she argues that jurors should be
instructed to consider normative reasonableness as well. Under Lee's
13. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 491 (3d ed. 2000).
14. See id. at 492 (explaining that self-defense "must be reasonably related to the
threatened harm which [defendant) seeks to avoid"); 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW
DEFENSES § 131(d), at 81 (1984) ("[The] force used by an actor must be reasonable in
relation to the harm threatened.").
15. LAFAVE, supra note 13, at 497-99.
16. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 7.10, at 654 (2d ed.
1986).
17. Id.
18. Seep. 235.
19. See pp. 235-36.
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vision, jurors in self-defense cases would consider not only whether
the defendant's response was typical, but also whether he should have
responded as he did. In provocation cases, jurors would consider not
only whether a typical person would have been provoked, but also
whether the defendant should have been provoked.
B.

The Fourth Amendment Analogy

Much of Lee's development of a normative standard of
reasonableness for substantive criminal law defenses draws upon
concepts of reasonableness seen in the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Under the familiar two-prong test first
articulated in Katz v. United States, government conduct constitutes a
"search" that must meet Fourth Amendment requirements only
if it implicates an expectation of privacy that is both subjectively
held and, more important for Lee's purposes, objectively reasonable. 20
Lee argues that, in applying the second, objective prong of
the Katz standard, the Supreme Court has used normative
concepts of reasonableness. 21
However, one could read at least some of the Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence as dependent on empirical notions of
reasonableness. For example, Lee argues that the Court used a
normative notion of reasonableness when it held in California v.
Greenwood22 that citizens do not hold reasonable expectations of
privacy in their garbage. Because Lee maintains that most people
would not expect their garbage to be searched by police, she argues
that the Court's holding constituted "a normative judgment about
whether people ought to expect privacy" (p. 240) in their garbage, not
an empirical judgment about "whether they actually do expect such
privacy" (p. 240). However, the Court rested its decision in part upon
its own assessment of empirical realities, observing that "[i]t is
common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a
public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers,
snoops, and other members of the public. "23
Similarly, at least some members of the Court relied on empirical
notions of reasonableness in determining whether citizens have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in property that can be observed
from aerial overflights. 24 For example, in Florida v. Riley25 police

20. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
21. See pp. 235-40.
22. 486 U.S. 35 (1988) .
23. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
24. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding that government observations
made while hovering over defendant's property in a helicopter did not constitute a search);
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observed the interior of the defendant's partially covered greenhouse
from a helicopter hovering four hundred feet above the defendant's
property. Although the Court held that the government's activity did
not implicate reasonable expectations of privacy and therefore did not
constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, the case did not
yield a majority opinion. Justice White's plurality opinion reasoned
that the conduct did not constitute a search, despite the low
flight altitude, because there was no legal restriction against flights
at that altitude.
However, five members of the Court appeared more interested in
the empirical realities of such flights than their normative non
proscription. In contrast to the plurality, Justice O'Connor was not
persuaded by the fact that helicopters could permissibly fly at four
hundred feet without violating applicable regulations. 26 In her view,
the relevant inquiry was whether public helicopters did in fact fly at
such altitudes with sufficient regularity to affect a reasonable person's
expectations of privacy. 27 Nevertheless, she concurred in the result
because she believed that the defendant bore the burden of proof with
respect to that issue and had not satisfied it. The four dissenting
justices agreed with Justice O'Connor that the actual extent of public
usage should be determinative, not applicable aviation regulations. 28
They simply disagreed about who should bear the burden of proof
with respect to the relevant inquiry and whether it had been met. 29
Ultimately, then, five members of the Court agreed that an empirical
inquiry controlled. 30

California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that visual inspection of defendant's
curtilage from an airplane one thousand feet above ground was not a search).
25.

488 U.S. at 448 (1989).

26. Riley, 488 U.S. at 454 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In determining whether Riley
had a reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial observation, the relevant inquiry after
Ciraolo is not whether the helicopter was where it had a right to be under FAA
regulations.").
27. Id. at 455 (reasoning that "if the public can generally be expected to travel over
residential backyards at an altitude of 400 feet, Riley cannot reasonably expect his curtilage
to be free from such aerial observation").
28.

See id. at 464 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 467 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

29. The dissenters would have held that the government should bear the burden of
showing that the public regularly engaged in the type of flight activity used for the
government's observation. Justice Brennan, with Justices Stevens and Marshall joining him,
would have held that the government had not borne its burden. Id. at 465 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun, in contrast, would have remanded for further fact finding. Id.
at 467 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 464-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("A majority of the Court thus agrees that the
fundamental inquiry is not whether the police were where they had a right to be under FAA
regulations, but rather whether Riley's expectation of privacy was rendered illusory by the
extent of public observation of his backyard from aerial traffic at 400 feet.").
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To be sure, something other than a purely empirical standard of
reasonableness is at play in the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Consider once again the Court's decision in
Greenwood. The Court's decision that the defendant lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy in discarded garbage turned not
solely on its belief that most people expect their dis'carded garbage to
be exposed to the public, but also on the broader rule that "what a
person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. "31 In other words, the Court may have
resorted to an empirical standard in defining the expectations of
reasonable (typical) people, but it made a separate determination that
whenever typical people anticipate the possibility of intrusion
by the public, it is normatively unreasonable to expect privacy from
the government.32
The Court's decision in Riley is an application of the same rule: If
the public engaged in helicopter hovering - either theoretically for
the plurality, or actually for the other members of the Court - then
the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation that the government
would not do the same. Katz's progeny is filled with similar examples
of the Court's "public access equals government access" rationale.33 In
the so-called "false friend" cases, the Court has held that the
government does not conduct a "search" subject to Fourth
Amendment requirements by wiring a cooperating friend to record
conversations with a target, because the target has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in conversations he chooses to have with a
friend.3 4 The Court has also held that citizens hold no protected
Fourth Amendment interests in financial records that are accessible
through their banks.3 5 Similarly, the government need not comply with
Fourth Amendment requirements when it installs pen-register
technology that reveals telephone numbers dialed by a target, because
the target has chosen to disclose that information to the telephone
company by placing outgoing calls. 3 6 In all of these cases the Court has

u.s

3 1 . California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
347, 351 (1967)).

32. Lee makes this same point when she argues that "even if one did expect some
persons . . . to go through one's trash, this doesn't mean one expects the police to do so" (p.
240) .
33. Sherry Colb has teased apart the public access rationale into two separate "moves,"
one in which the Court equates the risk of disclosure by third-party wrongdoing with a
privacy waiver, and a second in which the Court equates disclosure to a limited audience
with unlimited disclosure. See Sherry F. Colb, What ls a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in
Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119 (2002).
34. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).
35. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) .
36. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
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relied on both empirical judgments about what intrusions the typical
person expects from the public and the normative judgment that it is
unreasonable to expect privacy from the government once access has
been shared with some contingent of the public.
C.

The Collapse of the Theoretical Distinction

Most of the debate over "reasonableness" when invoked as a
criminal defense has been framed as a debate between objective and
subjective standards, or about which of the defendant's individual
character traits to attribute to the reasonable person.3 7 By drawing
upon the Supreme Court's considerable discussion of reasonableness
in an entirely different context, Lee adds another dimension to the
inquiry by carrying the tension between normative and empirical
standards from criminal procedure jurisprudence into substantive
criminal defense law.
An alternative way of viewing the Katz progeny in this context,
however, is as a demonstration of the inevitable collapse of normative
and empirical standards when applied. It is impossible to purify either
a normative or empirical standard of reasonableness because they are
both so malleable. Instead, one can view the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence as drawing upon whichever set of linguistic
terms most conveniently justifies the Court's ultimate determination.
For example, return again to Greenwood. 38 Lee concludes that the
Court must have applied a normative standard in the case, in part
because she believes that the decision is divorced from empirical
reality: "[H]ow many people actually expect children and nosy
neighbors to rummage through their trash? Of course the answer to
this question will vary depending upon the neighborhood, but I would
suspect that most people do not expect others to go through their
trash" (p. 240). The Supreme Court, however, had no problem
reaching a contrary empirical conclusion, writing off as "common
knowledge" the apparent fact that garbage can be rummaged through
by "animals, children, scavengers, snoops," and just about everyone
else the Court could conjure.39
Lee views Greenwood as an application of a normative standard of
reasonableness, not only because she excludes an empirical
explanation as unfathomable, but also because she sees the Court's
decision to equate public access to the garbage with police snooping as
a normative judgment about the privacy people ought to expect from
their government. However, the Court's articulation of that normative

37. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
38. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
39. Id. at 40 (citations omitted).
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judgment is ultimately entwined with its assessment that the public, as
an empirical matter, expects public (if not police) intrusions into their
garbage. Moreover, just as Lee excludes an empirical explanation of
Greenwood because it conflicts with her own beliefs about how that
standard plays out, one might exclude a normative explanation of the
case by concluding that it is normatively inappropriate for the
government to snoop through garbage.4 0
One explanation for the disparity between the Supreme Court's
view of empirical reasonableness and Lee's is that, absent statistical
evidence establis�1ing the empirical reality, all decisionmakers whether Supreme Court justices, law professors, or jurors - are
tempted to substitute their own judgment of reasonableness both for
the majority's and for what is normatively "right." As a consequence
of that tendency, opting between empirical and normative standards
of reasonableness will do little to assist or affect decisionmaking.
Under a normative standard, cases will turn on the choice between
"reasonable because it's what ought to be" and "unreasonable because
it's not what ought to be." Under an empirical standard, the dispute
will be "reasonable because it's typical" versus "unreasonable because
it's atypical." Either way, the inquiry devolves into an "is so/is not"
debate that can be resolved only by counting the votes.
Moreover, the outcome of the vote is not likely to change by
instructing jurors who are evaluating claims of self-defense or
provocation to use a normative rather than an empirical standard.
Imagine the process that jurors likely engage in when using an
empirical standard to determine if a reasonable person in the
defendant's position would have feared an imminent threat or been
impassioned to kill. Absent expert testimony to assist them, jurors are
likely to treat themselves as a sample of the larger community and
imagine their own responses. Indeed, even Lee appears tempted to
substitute her own values as the empirical norm when she observes,
for example, that "as a matter of empiricism, it probably isn't true that
most people would become so outraged as to kill in response to
partner infidelity or an unwanted sexual advance." 41 Similarly, she
believes that "[m]ost p eople, especially if we include women, the
elderly, and young children, probably would not kill if faced with a
threat of death or serious bodily injury." 42 In Lee's view, "an ordinary
person" would attempt some lesser form of self-defense, such as
escape or nonfatal defensive force (p. 237). One could easily imagine a
different decisionmaker with opposing normative views drawing

40. Colb, for example, has argued that the Court's public access rationale is normatively
"improper." Colb, supra note 33, at 1 75.
41 . P. 237 (emphasis added).
42. P. 237 (emphasis added).
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wholly different empirical conclusions about the probable reactions of
most ordinary people. Regardless of the definition of reasonableness,
jurors are going to ask themselves what they themselves would have
done, because they assume that they are the norm, both empirically
and morally.
Because of jurors' tendencies to look at themselves as both typical
and normatively correct, instructing jurors to employ normative as
well as empirical standards of reasonableness is unlikely to neutralize
the biases that concern Lee. Fortunately, Lee herself does not place
too much reliance upon this one suggestion for reform. When she
explains how a theoretical shift toward a normative standard will
remedy the equality problem she has identified, she continually
entwines this theoretical reform with her other two reforms - the
doctrinal reform of requiring "act reasonableness" in addition to
"emotion reasonableness," and the practical reform of role switching.
For example, when she explains how jurors should be required to use
both empirical and normative concepts of reasonableness, she
simultaneously includes her recommended doctrinal change: jurors
"should first consider whether the defendant's emotions or beliefs
were reasonable as a positivist matter (emotion reasonableness as a
function of typicality)," and should then consider "whether the
defendant's actions ought to be deemed reasonable (act
reasonableness as a normative matter)." 43 Similarly, when Lee
proposes her practical reform of role switching as a jury exercise,
she does so "[t]o give descriptive content to normative
reasonableness" (p. 252).
Ultimately, then, Lee's three recommendations are not entirely
separate. Lee conceptualizes her first recommendation as a necessary
theoretical shift, but one which requires her other two reforms in
order to be meaningful. I tum now to a discussion of those other
reforms and the broader questions they present.
II.

THE ACT-EMOTION DISTINCTION:

RULES V. STANDARDS

Lee's second suggested reform is to require jurors in self-defense
and provocation cases to consider not just the reasonableness of the
defendant's claimed emotion (fear or rage, respectively), but also the
reasonableness of the defendant's actions in response to that emotion
(pp. 260-75). In other words, in self-defense cases, jurors should
consider not only whether the defendant was reasonable in his
perception that the victim posed an imminent threat, but also whether
the defendant's conduct in response to that threat was reasonable. In
the provocation context, she argues that jurors should consider the
43. P. 244; see also p. 268 (suggested jury instruction defining emotion reasonableness in
terms of typicality and act reasonableness in terms of normative appropriateness).
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reasonableness not only of the defendant's passion, but also of the
defendant's violent response.
Lee makes an important contribution when she observes that
undeserving actors may get the benefit of criminal law defenses,
simply because their emotions are deemed reasonable. However, I am
not convinced that the remedy to this doctrinal gap is the addition of
an explicit element of "act reasonableness. " Both self-defense and
provocation already include elements that are intended to reflect both
act reasonableness and emotion reasonableness. As I explain further
in this Section, when the law does fail to require act reasonableness, it
is due to the use of rule-defined doctrines that fail to reflect the
standards that underlie the defenses. Accordingly, I reframe Lee's
discussion of the act/emotion distinction as an argument suppqrting
the defining of defenses through flexible standards, rather than
through imperfect rules intended to reflect those standards.
A. Act Reasonableness and Self-Defense
Lee herself acknowledges that her proposal to require act
reasonableness does little to alter current law, at least in the self
defense context. The doctrine of self-defense, she observes, "already
includes a reasonable act requirement" (p. 274). However, she argues
that the doctrine does so implicitly by including elements that are
intended to ensure that the defendant's conduct - not just his fear of
harm - was reasonable. For example, current self-defense law
includes a proportionality requirement, which provides that the
defendant's response must be reasonable in relation to the harm
avoided. 4 4 Lee also notes a requirement in some jurisdictions that the
defendant's response must be "reasonably necessary" (p. 274).
Accordingly, Lee views the addition of a requirement that the
defendant's acts be reasonable as "largely a clarification, rather than a
revision, of existing self-defense doctrine" (p. 272).
I, in contrast, see a larger point to be made here about the
doctrinal disjoint between reasonable fear and reasonable defensive
conduct. I have noted before that all of the various rules used to limit
self-defense claims reflect an attempt to define necessary - and
therefore, in Lee's terms, reasonable - defensive action. 4 5. Lee
distinguishes emotion reasonableness from act reasonableness, but she

44. P. 271. For a summary of the proportionality requirement, see generally GEORGE
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 870, § 10.5.4(D) (1978) (stating that only the
minimal use of force necessary under the circumstances is permitted, and the force used
must be in proportion to the interest defended); ROBINSON, supra note 14, § 131(d), at 81
("[The] force used by an actor must be reasonable in relation to the harm threatened.").
45. Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not
Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 276 (2002).
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concedes that in "most cases," the requirement that the defendant
reasonably fear imminent harm will help ensure that his conduct is
also reasonable. 4 6 In addition to the proportionality requirement, the
common "initial aggressor" limitation - which prohibits the initial
aggressor in a confrontation from claiming self-defense - can also be
seen as a proxy for necessity,47 barring the defense when the defendant
could have avoided the use of force through clean hands.48
By seeking to require that all acts of defensive force be reasonable,
Lee recommends more than the simple "clarification" that she
purports to suggest (p. 272). Although Lee correctly notes that current
self-defense rules attempt to ensure act reasonableness, they are in
fact an imperfect reflection of the underlying principles of necessity
that render defensive acts reasonable. In this respect, Lee's
observation of the potentially imperfect correlation between
reasonable fears and reasonable force can be seen as a reflection of
the larger imperfect fit between a self-defense doctrine defined by
rules, and the standard that the rules are intended to reflect.49 Current
self-defense law uses a rule-based approach to define permissible
defensive force; although those rules will in most cases capture uses of
force if and only if they are necessary, I (among others) have
previously noted the disjoint between current self-defense rules and
the underlying standard of necessity. 50
Consider, for example, two of the cases that Lee uses to
demonstrate that conduct in response to a reasonable fear of
46. P. 269 (noting a "presumption that a defendant who reasonably fears imminent
harm acts reasonably as well. In most cases, a correlation between reasonable fears and
reasonable acts will exist.").
47. Many jurisdictions prohibit the initial aggressor in a confrontation from claiming
self-defense. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 224-25 (3d ed.
2001); FLETCHER, supra note 44, § 10.5.2 at 858; LAFAVE, supra note 13, at 497; ROBINSON,
supra note 14, § 132 n.5 at 98.
48. See Burke, supra note 45, at 277 (noting that the initial aggressor exception "has
been explained as reflecting the lesser moral rights of the initial aggressor," but could "also
be seen as barring the application of [self-defense] to conduct that, when viewed through a
wider time frame, was unnecessary").
49. Whereas rules attempt to define law with particularity, standards articulate the
policies and goals underlying the law. As Kathleen Sullivan has stated so succinctly about
the rules/standards distinction, a law "is 'standard'-like when it tends to collapse
decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a
fact situation." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992). In contrast, a law "is 'rule'-like when it binds a decisionmaker
to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts." Id.
50. See ROBINSON, supra note 14, § 131(c)(l), at 78; Jeffrey B. Murdoch, Is Imminence
Really Necessity? Reconciling Traditional Self-defense Doctrine with the Battered Woman
Syndrome, 20 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 191 (2000); Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence,
and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REV 371, 398 (1993); Burke, supra note 45,
at 277-86 (arguing that elimination of the imminency requirement and adoption of the duty
to retreat would make self-defense rules a more perfect reflection of the standard of
necessity).
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imminent harm may not always be reasonable. In State v. Dill, s1 the
defendant shot the victim in the head from the driver's seat of his car
after the victim approached his open window with a knife . In State v.
Garrison,s2 the defendant disarmed the victim, then shot the victim
with his own gun when he advanced toward him with a steak knife .
Despite claims of self-defense, both defendants were convicted, and
both convictions were affirmed. s3 It is perhaps because of the
outcomes in those cases that Lee perceives the addition of an "act
reasonableness" requirement as a mere clarification of existing law.
However, the distinction between emotion reasonableness and act
reasonableness was salient to the appellate courts in Dill and
Garrison, and the convictions in those cases were affirmed, only
because the relevant jurisdictions imposed a duty to retreat upon
claimed self-defenders. s4 In Dill, the court reasoned that the trier of
fact may have concluded that the defendant could have retreated from
the conflict by driving away or by shooting the defendant in a less
"vital" area than the head. ss Similarly, in Garrison, the court noted
that the defendant had less drastic alternatives available to him, such
as retreating after he initially shot the defendant in the ankle. s6
To the appellate courts in Dill and Garrison, then, the defendants'
acts wen� unreasonable, despite reasonable apprehension of harm,
because the defendants failed to explore reasonable retreat options
prior to using defensive force. s7 Lee appears to view Dill and Garrison
as typical, perhaps explaining her quick concession that self-defense
law needs a mere "clarification" to assure that jurors consider the
reasonableness of a defendant's acts. In fact, the cases are not typical.
A majority of jurisdictions reject the common law duty to retreat, ss
even though such a duty would appear to be an obvious requirement if

51. 461 So. 2d 1130 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
52. 525 A.2d 498 (Conn. 1987).
53. Garrison, 525 A.2d at 502; Dill, 461 So. 2d at 1140.
54. When applicable, the common law duty to retreat requires the defendant to pursue
reasonable opportunities to retreat safely from the threat of unlawful force. See generally
LAFAVE, supra note 13, at 497-99.
55. Dill, 461 So. 2d at 1138.
56. Garrison, 525 A.2d at 500.
57. In Garrison, the court applied a state statute that expressly imposed a duty to
retreat. Id. In Dill, the court recognized that even though state law did not contain a
doctrinal duty to retreat, the possibility of retreat was nevertheless a factor in determining
whether the defendant's force was necessary. Dill, 461 So. 2d at 1138.
58. Although a significant number of jurisdictions require a duty to seek reasonably safe
retreat options, the majority approach is generally described as rejecting a duty to retreat.
See Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 562 (1895); Idrogo v. People, 818 P.2d 752, 756
(Colo. 1991); Ervin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 286, 186, 193, 199 (1876). See generally LAFAVE,
supra note 13, at 498.
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the doctrine of self-defense is intended to apply only to necessary uses
of force. 59
The modem rejection of the common law duty to retreat is an
expansion of self-defense that reflects not principles of necessity, but
principles of autonomy. Moreover, the concept of autonomy exhibited
in the rejection of the duty to retreat appears to be a uniquely
masculine one. Professor Mahoney relays the following anecdote to
demonstrate possible gender differences in attitudes about the
respectability of safe retreat: A woman tells a man in a bar that if she
could fight off an assailant and run away, she would consider herself
the winner in the attack, because she would have escaped safely; the
man in the bar disagrees, viewing the woman in the imagined
confrontation as the loser because she had to run away. 60 In most
jurisdictions, the law of self-defense reflects the values of the man in
the bar, rejecting a duty to retreat in lofty statements about "true
man" 61 and his "divine right" 62to "stand his ground." 63
While the self-defense doctrine strays from principles of necessity
to favor male values by rejecting a duty to retreat, it includes a
requirement of imminence64 that can disfavor defendants who act
absent an imminent threat, but nevertheless out of necessity. Although
one can conjure up hypothetical cases that demonstrate the
unnecessary rigidity of the imminence requirement, 65 the
requirement's most significant practical impact has been to hinder self-

59. See Burke, supra note 45, at 283 ("A duty to retreat from a threatening situation
before using force inherently follows from a requirement that defensive force be
necessary."); see also State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 820 (N.D. 1983) ("[B]efore it can
be said that the use of deadly force is 'necessary' to protect the actor against death or serious
injury, it must first be the case that the actor cannot retreat from the assailant with safety to
himself and others.").
60. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 64 (1991) (discussing gender differences in perceptions of
control).
61. Ervin, 29 Ohio St. at 199 (1876) ("[A] true man who is without fault is not obliged to
fly from an assailant.").
62. Miller v. State, 119 N.W. 850, 857 (Wis. 1909).
63. Id. For an historical analysis of the rejection of the duty to retreat, see RICHARD
MAXWELL BROWN, VIOLENCE AND VALUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY 4-30
(1991).
64. In most jurisdictions, self-defense requires the defendant to have a reasonable belief
that the victim presents an imminent threat of unlawful physical force. See generally
DRESSLER, supra note 47, at 221-23; LAFAVE, supra note 13, at 491.

65. Paul Robinson, for example, hypothesizes a kidnap victim who has been told that his
death will come in a week. If an opportunity to kill the kidnapper and escape presented itself
on the fourth day, strict application of the imminence requirement would appear to require
the kidnap victim to forego the opportunity and to wait until his death is imminent.
ROBINSON, supra note 14, § 131(c)(l), at 78.
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defense claims by women who kill their abusers. 6 6 Most battered
women who kill in claimed self-defense do so during a confrontation, 6 7
but more than an aberrational few have done so during seeming
ly peaceful breaks in the violence, such as when their abusers
were sleeping. 68
In some but not all of these cases, the defendants may have been
able to persuade fact finders that their use of force was necessary, but
their self-defense claims were nevertheless rejected because of the
imminence requirement. Consider, for example, the facts of State v.
Norman.69 Married at the age of fourteen, Judy Norman had suffered
twenty-five years of forced prostitution and appalling physical and
emotional abuse by the time she shot her sleeping husband. She had
also tried several times to leave him, only to be found and forced back
for additional, worsening abuse. Just prior to her husband's death, she
was trying once again to leave, this time by having her husband
committed and applying for social-service benefits to support herself.
When her husband found out, he threatened to kill her if anyone came
for him or if she tried to leave again.
If self-defense were defined by the standard of necessity, Norman
and women like her would at least have a claim to make for the jury.
"I know there was no imminent threat," they could argue, "but he
didn't give me any safe alternatives." However, because of the rule of
imminence, battered women who kill in nonconfrontational

66. The application of the imminence requirement to battered women who kill has been
the subject of considerable scholarly discussion. See, e.g., ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER,
BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 124 (2000); Susan Estrich, Defending
Women, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1430, 1431-32 (1990); Mahoney, supra note 60, at 89-92; Murdoch,
supra note 50; Stephen J. Rosen, supra note 50, at 398; Schulhofer, The Gender Question in
Criminal Law, 7 Soc. PHIL. & Po. 105, 127 (1990). My point in this review is not to explore
fully either the imminence requirement or its application to battered women. Rather, I use
the imminence requirement and its impact on the category of battered women who act
absent an imminent confrontation to illustrate the potential for seemingly neutral self
defense standards to impact categories of defendants adversely.
67. Maguigan, supra note 1, at 384, 397-401 (reporting that seventy to ninety percent of
battered women who kill do so during a confrontation).
68. In a recent survey of a sample of reported cases, Victoria Nourse concluded that
most battered women who killed did so during a confrontation. See Victoria F. Nourse, Self
Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1253 (2001). Nevertheless, in cases
involving claims of self-defense in non-confrontational circumstances, the defendants were
more likely to be battered women. Id. at 1253-54 (reporting that battered women made up
less than a third of the cases in the sample, but comprised fifty-seven percent of the non
confrontation cases).
69. 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989). Considerable scholarly commentary has addressed the
Norman case. See, e.g., Claire 0. Finkelstein, Self-Defense as a Rational Excuse, 57 U. PITT.
L. REV. 621, 623-31 (1996); Mahoney, supra note 60, at 89-92; Rosen, supra note 50, at 398;
Kerry A. Shad, Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1989, State v. Norman: Self
Defense Unavailable to Battered Women Who Kill Passive Abusers, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1159
(1990); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Self-Defense, Domination, and the Social Contract, 57 U.
PITT. L. REV. 579, 583-85 (1996).
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circumstances have been forced as a litigation strategy to resort to the
so-called battered woman syndrome, claiming that they suffer from a
psychological condition that causes them to fear "imminent" harm
when other reasonable actors without the syndrome would not.70
Lee's primary concern is the inequality she perceives in the
availability of criminal law defenses.71 However, by focusing primarily
on the ways in which reliance on social norms can pervert jurors'
application of the law to facts in individual cases, she misses the
opportunity to make a larger doctrinal point. It is not merely jurors
applying the law who might favor male values; it is the law itself.7 2
Resorting to a standard of necessity would eliminate the requirement
of imminence, but require a duty to retreat, changes that would render
the defense itself more gender neutral.
Of course, with a neutral doctrine as a starting point to a fair
system of defenses, Lee's concerns about equities in the application of
the law would still remain: jurors might apply the neutral legal
standard differently to classes of defendants depending on whom they
envisioned as "reasonable." They might, for example, be quick to
believe a white defendant's claim that he reasonably believed that his
conduct against a black victim was necessary. Resolving that equality
problem requires Lee's third suggestion for reform, the trial practice
of "switching," discussed in Section III. First, however, I turn to the
distinction of emotion reasonableness and act reasonableness

70. See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634 (D.C. 1979) (reasoning that
battered woman syndrome provides "a basis from which the jury could understand why [the
defendant] perceived herself in imminent danger at the time of the shooting"); State v.
Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 377 (N.J. 1984) (holding that evidence that the defendant suffered from
battered woman syndrome "would have aided [the jury] in determining whether, under the
circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed there was imminent danger to her
life"); State v. Kelly, 685 P.2d 564, 570 (Wash. 1984) (expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome was "offered to aid the jury in understanding the reasonableness of [the
defendant's] apprehension of imminent death or bodily injury").
71. Ironically, as discussed further in Part III, Lee says little about the battered woman
cases, even though the resort to the battered woman syndrome appears to be similar to the
reliance on stereotypes that she condemns in the categories of cases she chooses to discuss.
Whereas defendants in infidelity, racial fear, and gay panic cases claim reasonableness based
on their maleness, whiteness, and heterosexuality, respectively, defendants invoking
battered woman syndrome claim reasonableness based on stereotypes about female
helplessness.
72. Although Lee does not discuss the imminency requirement at length, or explore the
ways in which demonstrates a conflict between rules and standards, she does recommend
adopting the Model Penal Code's less stringent standard of "immediate necessity." P. 27273; cf Joshua Dressler, Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormentors: Reflections on
Maintaining Respect for Human Life While Killing Moral Monsters, in CRIMINAL LAW
THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 259, 275 (Stephen Schute & A.P. Simester
eds., 2002) (calling the immediate necessity standard a "suitable compromise" between the
imminency requirement and its elimination). Even the Model Penal Code standard,
however, does not apply to an actor who needed to act inevitably but not immediately.
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in the provocation context and an analogous conflict between rules
and standards.
B.

Act Reasonableness and Provocation

At the heart of the partial defense of provocation has always lain
recognition that the actor who kills under the influence of intense,
reasonable emotion is less culpable and therefore less deserving of
punishment than one who acts with a cool head. 73 Historically,
however, the common law did not permit the jury to decide whether
the defendant's claimed emotion was sufficiently intense or reasonable
to mitigate culpability. Rather, the doctrine defined some categories of
provocation sufficient as a matter of law, while all others were deemed
insufficient. 7 4 Under the modern reform standard, these rigid
definitions of provocation have given way to a generalized
"reasonable person" standard of provocation that jurors are entrusted
to apply. 7 5 The modern approach grants the defendant considerable
leeway to argue to the jury that the source of his provocation was
sufficient, regardless of whether it fell within one of the categories of
provocation recognized at common law. 7 6
In Section II.A, discussing self-defense, I attributed the gap Lee
notes between act reasonableness and emotion reasonableness to a
self-defense doctrine defined by rules that fail to reflect self-defense's
underlying standard of necessity. In this Section, I make a similar
argument in the provocation context, tracing the provocation
doctrine's traditional failure to scrutinize what Lee terms act
reasonableness to the common law's preference for rules over
standards. Moreover, just as the rules of self-defense seem to
incorporate male values, so did the traditional rules of provocation.

73. As the commentators to the Model Penal Code explain,
[P)rovocation affects the quality of the actor's state of mind as an indicator of moral
blameworthiness. . . . It is a concession to human weakness and perhaps to non-deterrability,
a recognition of the fact that one who kills in response to certain provoking events should be
regarded as demonstrating a significantly different character deficiency than one who kills in
their absence.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 5(a) (1980).
74. See id. (noting that the common law doctrine of provocation mitigated murder to
manslaughter when the killing was triggered by a physical attack, mutual combat, or
witnessing adultery).
75. The Model Penal Code's standard of "extreme emotional disturbance" or "EED,"
for example, applies if the jury concludes that a homicide was committed "under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable
explanation or excuse." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1) (1962).
76. See DRESSLER, supra note 47, at 529 (noting that "many states" have rejected the
common law's categorical approach, adopting the "view that the issue of what constitutes
adequate provocation should be left to the jury to decide").
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Neutralization of Provocation Doctrine Through the Shift from
Common Law Rules to the Modern Reasonableness Standard

Like any conflict between rules and standards, the shift from
common law's categorical approach to the modem reasonable person
approach raises questions about the relative benefits of the
predictability offered by rules and the flexibility offered by standards,
and the relative merits of ex ante decisionmaking by courts or
legislatures and ex post decisionmaking by juries. 7 7 Lee discusses those
general conflicts thoughtfully, eventually rejecting the rules-based
approach of the early common law in favor of the modem reasonable
person standard in order to vest juries with decisionmaking discretion
and to avoid an abandonment of what she sees as advances in
provocation law since common law categorization. 78
I raise the rules/standards conflict not to resolve it generally or
even more narrowly in the provocation context, but to make a
qualitatively different point about the equality of the provocation
doctrine. Independent of the common law's comparative aversion to
flexible decisionmaking by jurors is the issue of which rules the
common law chose to employ. Many of the inequities that Lee cites
regarding the provocation doctrine can be attributed to the gendered
and racialized norms reflected in the categories of provocation
recognized at common law. To at least some extent, then, her concerns
about equality in the application of the law should be assuaged
by the movement away from those imperfect rules toward a more
'
flexible standard.
The provocation doctrine emerged at ·common law to distinguish
certain forms of male fatal violence as less culpable than murder. The
earliest manslaughter law developed during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, when even trivial altercations might trigger
fatal results in men who carried weapons by custom. 79 By recognizing
that a reasonable heat of passion could negate the malice required for
77. By providing flexibility, laws defined by standards are seen as avoiding the over
inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness that can result from imperfectly drawn rules. In
contrast, by dictating factors that are relevant considerations, laws defined by rules are seen
as avoiding the imperfections and inconsistencies of ad hoc decisionmakers. See FREDERICK
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 149-55 (1991). For an overview of the
rules/standards debate, see MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRmCAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63
(1987); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
557-629 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1686-1713 (1976); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of
Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 783-90 (1989); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 379 (1985).
78. See pp. 247-49.
79. Laurie J. Taylor, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion
Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1684 n.30 (1986).
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murder, the law of provocation saved defendants who killed during
such "chance medleys" or sudden brawls from the death sentence that
a murder conviction would carry.8 0
When the common law did expand to recognize a category of
provocation other than physical attack or mutual combat, it was to
include the "sight of adultery," explaining the long tradition that Lee
explores of punishing men who murder their wives for manslaughter
rather than murder. The adultery-provocation expansion not only
continued to describe the male violence captured by the traditional
doctrine, but also enlarged the defense to include male violence
against women, because it mitigated the killing of not just the
paramour but the adulterous wife.81 With the growth of the adultery
provocation branch of the doctrine, provocation law reflected not just
a judicial understanding of the physical reactions of men, but
prevalent norms about women as male property:
[J]ealousy is the rage of a man, and adultery is the highest invasion of
property . . . . If a thief comes to rob another, it is lawful to kill him. And
if a man comes to rob a man's posterity and his family, yet to kill him is
manslaughter. So is the law though it may seem hard, that the killing in
the one case should not be as j ustifiable as the other. . . . So that a man
cannot receive a higher provocation.82

Like the rules on retreat and imminence in the self-defense
context, the adultery-provocation doctrine purported to be gender
neutral,83 but had an unquestionably disparate impact by gender. In
cases of domestic homicide, male offenders tend to kill because
of perceived infidelity or other rejection; women tend to kill in
claimed self-defense.84

80. See id.
81. See Rowland v. State, 35 So. 826, 827 (Miss. 1904) ("There can be no difference in
the degree of the crime, whether the betrayed husband slays the faithless wife or her guilty
paramour."). Other scholars have written at length of the provocation doctrine's reflection
of male entitlement, both under common law and with the modern "reform." See, e.g.,
SCHNEIDER, supra note 66, at 1 16-17 (noting that the criminal law has historically been
understanding of male jealousy and its resulting violence); Emily L. Miller,
(Wo)manslaughter: Voluntary Manslaughter, Gender, and the Model Penal Code, 50 EMORY
L.J. 665 (2001) (discussing the devaluing of women's lives by the manslaughter doctrine,
both under the common law and Model Penal Code approaches); Victoria Nourse, Passion's
Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1332-33
(1997) (arguing that the Model Penal Code's reform has expanded the defense to include
men's violent reactions not only to infidelity, but more commonly to rejection).
82. Regina v. Mawgridge, 84 Eng. Rep. 1 107, 1115 (Q.B. 1707).
83. See Holmes v. Dir. of Pub. Publications, 2 All E.R. 124, 128 (H.L. 1946) (holding
that female defendants could claim provocation by a husband's infidelity).
84. The social science literature suggests the most common motivation for women who
killed their mates was self-defense; men were most likely to kill in response to potential or
actual separation by their partner. See George W. Barnard et al, Till Death Do Us Part: A
Study of Spouse Murder, 10 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 271, 274 (1982).
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The common law categorization approach has also contributed to
the racial inequities that Lee examines in the provocation context. For
example, consider Lee's discussion of the "mere words" rule. Because
the common law categories of provocation all involved physical acts
like combat, adultery, and attack, mere words alone could never
mitigate manslaughter to murder.8 5 Despite the movement away from
the categorization approach toward a standard-based defense, many
jurisdictions continue to apply the mere words rule as a vestige of the
common law.8 6 Lee argues that the rule has been applied unequally,
contrasting men who kill their wives in response to verbal reports or
confessions of adultery - who are permitted to claim provocation and black defendants who kill in response to racial insults - who are
not.8 7 To Lee, both classes of cases involve a defendant responding to
words; accordingly, they should be treated equally (pp. 61-62).
Lee appears to view the seeming disparity as a racially biased
application of the mere words rule. However, it can be traced back to
the categories of provocation that marked the historical version of the
defense. Although the adultery-provocation doctrine initially included
only "sight of provocation" claims, the law of provocation eventually
expanded further to include an exception to the mere words rule for
words conveying events that would have constituted adequate
provocation had the actor witnessed them personally.88 Accordingly,
the exceptions to the mere words rule reflected the same biases
underlying the provocation doctrine itself. Lee suggests abolishing the
mere words rule as a means of eradicating inconsistencies in
the rule {pp. 62-63).
That Lee views the abolishment of one of the last remaining
provocation rules as necessary to remedy a perceived inequity
demonstrates my larger point about achieving neutral defense
doctrines by starting with neutral standards. Viewed in its historical
context, the mere words rule stands as an exception to the modem
trend away from the rules that marked the common law doctrine,
toward a standard defined by reasonableness. A rule established ex
ante providing that no reasonable person can ever be provoked to
violence by words, regardless of surrounding circumstances, is
85. DRESSLER, supra note 47, at 529.
86. Id.
87. Pp. 58-62. Joshua Dressler has noted that the mere words rule can be " harsh."
DRESSLER, supra note 47, at 529. For example, in People v. Green, a black defendant killed
his white neighbor after the neighbor told the defendant he had shot the defendant's dog
because "it was bad enough living around nigger[s], much less dogs." 519 N.W.2d 853, 856
(Mich. 1994). Even though the victim's verbal statement contained both a highly degrading
racial insult and information about an impassioning event, strict application of the rule, as
Dressler notes, would foreclose the defendant from a claim of provocation. DRESSLER,
supra note 47, at 529-30.
88. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 5(a) (1980).
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inconsistent with the intent of modem reform to leave the "ultimate
judgment" of the reasonableness of the defendant's loss of self-control
"to the ordinary citizen in the function of a juror assigned to resolve
the specific case."89
Despite the continued vitality of the mere words rule, it is
gradually falling into disfavor. The Model Penal Code rejects the rule,
and even some jurisdictions that retain the rule have suggested that
there may be exceptions.9() Moving from the common law's
categorization approach to the conte�porary reasonableness standard
(sans the mere words rule) provides the necessary starting point for
equality. Lee, however, is not satisfied with that standard and suggests
changing the modem standard still further by adding an explicit
element of act reasonableness. I turn next to that recommendation.
2.

Raising the Bar on the Reasonableness Standard

In addition to advocating a generalized standard of provocation
that permits jurors to determine case-by-case whether sufficient
mitigation exists (pp. 247-49), Lee argues that the provocation
doctrine should be changed to require act reasonableness in addition
to emotion reasonableness (pp. 262-69). One might assume from Lee's
analysis of the act/emotion distinction that she would require jurors to
determine whether a reasonable person in the defendant's
circumstances would have been both impassioned and moved to kill
by his passion. Only then could the actor be deemed reasonable in
both his emotions and his actions.
However, Lee recognizes that manslaughter applies only as a
partial defense exactly because the criminal law reflects the normative
view that a reasonable person is not moved to kill by passion (p. 262).
When emotion is appropriately considered sufficient to trigger a fatal
response in the reasonable person, the criminal law provides a
complete defense, as it does in the self-defense and duress contexts.91
The impassioned manslaughterer, in other words, is treated as less
89. See id. at 63.
90. Within the application of the mere words rule, some courts distinguish between
words that convey information about events and words that are merely insulting, permitting
provocation claims for the former but not the latter. See Commonwealth v. Berry, 336 A.2d
262 (Pa. 1975) (defendant's mother informed defendant that victim assaulted her). Some
courts have suggested that, despite the mere words rule, even merely insulting words might
support a provocation claim in extreme circumstances. People v. Pouncey, 471 N.W.2d 346,
351 (Mich. 1991); State v. Shane, 590 N.E.2d 272, 278 (Ohio 1992).
91. The defense of duress applies when the defendant commits the offense at the
demand of a third party, if the defendant reasonably believes that a failure to do so will
cause his imminent death or serious injury. See generally Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the
Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV.
1331, 1365 (1989); Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 273-74 (1987).
For a summary of self-defense law, see supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.

May 2005]

Equality, Objectivity, and Neutrality

1065

culpable than the unimpassioned murderer, but he is not
relieved entirely of culpability. It makes sense, then, that the standard
of the defense is lower, requiring the jury to find not that the
defendant's fatal conduct was in fact reasonable, but simply his
triggering emotions.
Because Lee recognizes that the impassioned manslaughterer is
not, in fact, required to be wholly reasonable, she does not go so far as
to recommend that juries determine as part of the provocation inquiry
whether the homicide was actually reasonable. Instead, she seeks to
employ a principle of proportionality to measure the reasonableness
of the defendant's conduct in response to the provoking incident.92
Specifically, she recommends that jurors examine the reasonableness
of the defendant's emotion by determining whether a reasonable
person in the defendant's circumstances would have been provoked
into a heat of passion, then examine the reasonableness of the
defendant's acts by determining whether the defendant's response
bears a reasonable relationship to the provoking act or incident.93 She
explains, for example, that homicide would be a disproportionate and
therefore unreasonable response to a victim's unjustified slap of
the defendant (p. 265).
I see two problems with this aspect of Lee's proposal. First, it is
unclear whether this recommended "reform" is anything other than a
semantic change from current doctrine. Although Lee argues that a
majority of jurisdictions instruct jurors only regarding emotion
reasonableness, her own discussion makes clear that these same
instructions describe an intensity of emotion that serves as a fair proxy
for the reasonableness of the defendant's physical response. Typical
jury instructions, for example, require "intense passion,"9 4 "gross"9 5 or
"serious provocation,"96 and a "passion . . . so violent as to . . . prevent

92. This additional element appears to lie somewhere between what Lee calls act
reasonableness and emotion reasonableness: it requires reasonableness of some physical
conduct, but not of fatal conduct. As Lee states, "Requiring the jury to focus on the
reasonableness of the defendant's actions does not mean they must find it was reasonable for
the defendant to kill. Rather, act reasonableness can be satisfied if the provoking incident
would have provoked an ordinary person to violence" (p.. 264).

93. As explained in Section I, supra, Lee views the addition of an act reasonableness
requirement as bringing a normative, rather than an empirical, notion of reasonableness to
criminal defenses. Accordingly, her suggested jury instruction encourages j urors to use an
empirical notion of reasonableness in evaluating emotion reasonableness and a normative
notion of reasonableness in evaluating act reasonableness. P. 268 (setting forth sample jury
instruction providing that the defendant's emotions should be compared to the emotions of
an "ordinary" person, and that the defendant's acts must be "normatively reasonable" by
bearing a proportional relationship to the provocation).
94. ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
CRIMINAL CASES, No. 7.03 (4th ed. 2000); ALASKA STAT. § ll.41.115(f)(2) (1988).
95. NEW JERSEY PLEADING AND PRACTICE FORMS § 93:161 (1999).
96. ALASKA STAT. § l l.41.115(f)(2) (1988).
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thought and reflection"9 7 or to "cause complete loss of self-control."98
They make clear, similarly, that "[m]ere anger . . . is not sufficient."99
At least indirectly, therefore, act reasonableness is already embedded
in the current standard's emphasis on both the extremeness of the
required emotion and the seriousness of the required provocation.
My second, larger concern about Lee's desire to add an explicit
proportionality component to the provocation doctrine is that the
solution appears ill-matched with the original problems that warranted
Lee's
re-examination . of reasonableness.
Articulating
act
reasonableness separately, Lee concedes, is "not a radical departure
from modern provocation doctrine. It merely encourages jurors to
think about the defendant's provocation claim more fully" (pp. 2 6869). In her own words, Lee is "heightening juror scrutiny of all claims
of reasonableness, making it more difficult for defendants claiming
they were provoked" (p. 273).
Lee sees the raising of the defense bar as a means of addressing
her identified problem of invisible juror bias:
Whenever inequities exist in the criminal justice system, one can either
ratchet up the scrutiny so that everyone is scrutinized as carefully as the
most carefully scrutinized defendant or ratchet down the scrutiny to the
level of scrutiny enjoyed by the least scrutinized defendant. Adopting my
proposed reforms . . . represents a choice to ratchet up the scales, so that
majority culture defendants' claims of reasonableness are subjected to
the same kind of scrutiny accorded others. Ratcheting up may not be
appropriate in all cases, but it makes particular sense when the defendant
has taken another human being's life (pp. 277-78).

As an initial matter, one might just as easily conclude that
ratcheting down may be most appropriate when the defendant's
conviction will lead to the most severe consequences the criminal
justice system has to offer. More importantly, however, Lee's
assumption that the problem of invisible juror bias can be solved with
either a "ratcheting down" or "ratcheting up" approach is misplaced.
If a bar is unlevel, it can be leveled only by adjusting one side more
than the other.100 Lee's recommendation, in contrast, would appear
simply to raise the bar entirely, with its original slant intact.

97. State v. McDermott, 449 P.2d 545, 548 (Kan. 1969) (quoting 1 RONALD A.
ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 275 (1957) ).
98. WISCONSIN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL), No. 21 (2001) .
99.

McDermott, 449 P.2d a t 548 (quoting ANDERSON, supra note 97) .

100. One such solution would be to revert to a categorical approach, encouraging
legislation that defined provocation to exclude the categories that Lee believes have been
overly successful with jurors. Lee considers such an approach but ultimately rejects moving
to legislatively-drawn categories as a way of ensuring act reasonableness, because it removes
discretion from the jury (whom she largely trusts, despite her concerns about bias) and turns
back the clock on advances made in provocation cases (pp. 247-49).
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Lee asserts two arguments to support her approach of raising the
bar for all defendants by requiring both act and emotion
reasonableness. First, she states that a neutral raising of the bar is a
more feasible change politically than one that is specific to one gender,
race, or sexual orientation.1 01 I would not argue with that observation,
but the observation says nothing about whether a raising of the bar
addresses Lee's equality concerns. Second, she argues that a raising of
the bar would lead to more just results in the three categories of cases
that trouble her (pp. 273-74). That, of course, rests on an assumption
that the acquittals and mitigations in female infidelity, gay panic, and
racialized-fear cases are unjust not just relatively, but absolutely. In
other words, the argument stems from Lee's own political view that
more homicides should be punished as murder. That position,
whatever its merit, does nothing to address Lee's primary goal of
neutralizing juror bias. The same jurors who are encouraged to think
"more fully" about provocation claims in the cases that trouble Lee
will be thinking more fully in all other cases, leaving in place the same
potential to employ biased social norms.
In the end, then, Lee's primary reform for the provocation
doctrine, at least with respect to equality, requires her final
recommendation of "switching." I turn now to that aspect of
Lee's proposal.
Ill. ATIRIBUTING TRAITS TO THE REASONABLE PERSON:
OBJECTIVITY v. SUBJECTIVITY

To implement her recommendation of adding a normative
dimension to the reasonableness inquiry in self-defense and
provocation cases, Lee proposes that courts instruct jurors to try to
prevent dominant social norms, including " masculinity norms,
heterosexuality norms, and race norms," from influencing their
decisionmaking (pp. 252-53). To assist jurors in determining whether
they have been influenced by silent biases, courts should instruct juries
to switch the genders, races, and/or sexual orientations of the actors
involved in the case.1 0 2 If this "switching" exercise alters the jury's
conclusion about the case, jurors should reconsider whether they have
been influenced by such norms.
Lee's analysis of switching is largely pragmatic, emphasizing the
potential of switching to remedy the inequities she perceives in female

101. According to Lee, "[t)he liberal mantra of color blindness in the area of race and
sameness equality in the arena of gender encourages lawmakers to adopt race-neutral and
gender-neutral language, even when such language often is anything but" (p. 273).
102. P. 273. Lee's earlier work in this area also proposed switching. See Lee, supra note
1, at 482.
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infidelity, gay panic, and racialized-fear cases.1 03 In provocation cases
involving infidelity, for example, switching would require jurors
evaluating the claim of a man who killed a woman to assess the
reasonableness of the defendant's emotions and conduct from the
perspective of a woman in the defendant's situation. If the defendant
were a woman who killed a man, jurors would consider whether they
would believe the provocation claim if asserted by a man. In cross
racial self-defense cases, jurors would be asked to switch the races of
the defendant and victim to consider whether their evaluation of the
defendant's self-defense claim is affected by racial bias. Finally, in
gay panic cases, jurors could evaluate reasonableness from the
perspective of a gay man faced with an unwanted heterosexual
advance from a woman (p. 253).
In this Section, I first attempt to situate Lee's practical suggestion
within a larger theoretical framework, arguing that her desire for
switching demonstrates the desirability of an objective standard of
reasonableness. I then tum to an application of an objective standard
of reasonableness, aided by Lee's switching practice, in cases other
than the three categories that Lee emphasizes.
A. Neutralizing the Reasonable Person
A starting point for situating Lee's switching practice within an
objective standard of reasonableness requires a brief overview of the
objective-subjective dichotomy and the contexts in which it is raised in
criminal defenses.
1.

Explaining Objectivity

I have previously identified elsewhere three distinct terminological
contexts for comparing "objective" and "subjective" standards.104 A
first use of the dichotomy is to distinguish between a subjective
standard that measures only the sincerity of defendant's own beliefs
and an objective standard that requires the defendant's honest, actual
beliefs to be measured against those of a reasonable person. In this
first context, the law is well settled: self-defense and provocation
require consideration of both the defendant's actual beliefs and the
reasonableness of those beliefs. In other words, the self-defender's
perception of an unlawful threat and the impassioned killer's
emotional distress must not only be honest, they must also
be reasonable.
103. See p. 253.
104. See Burke, supra note 45, at 286-91 . Although I set forth an understanding of the
objective-subjective dichotomy in the self-defense context, the same comparisons can be
made in the provocation context.
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A second use of the objective-subjective duality occurs within the
standard of reasonableness to describe whether jurors should be
permitted to contextualize the reasonableness inquiry by considering
circumstances specific to the individual defendant when measuring the
defendant's reasonableness. In this context, an "objective" standard of
reasonableness is said to employ the unmodified hypothetical
reasonable person as the model of comparison, while a "subjective"
standard of reasonableness permits the jury to ascribe to the
reasonable person the individual characteristics of the defendant. For
advocates of a contextualized standard of reasonableness, the battered
woman who kills has come to represent the standard's deserving
beneficiary to the extent her self-defense claim requires jurors to
consider all of the facts and circumstances surrounding her decision to
kill, including her gender.10 5 Infamous subway killer Bernard Goetz
stands in contrast as a call for avoiding contextualization.106 Permitting
battered women to contextualize the reasonableness inquiry, the
argument goes, opens the door for a defendant like Goetz to invoke
stereotypes when he argues that he, as a prior robbery victim,
reasonably feared a group of young black men on the subway.1 0 7
However, it is well settled that the standard of reasonableness must
be contextualized to at least some extent. Even the earliest self
defense cases recognized that the defendant's reasonableness must be
assessed from the perspective of a reasonable person in the
defendant's situation.1 08 A jury could never, for example, consider the
reasonableness of a defendant's belief that the victim was going to stab
him without considering the fact that the victim was raising a knife
toward the defendant immediately before the defendant's conduct.

105. One of the earliest battered woman cases reversed the defendant's murder
conviction because the trial court had inappropriately used an "objective" standard of
reasonableness. See State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977).
106. After two prior robbery victimizations, Bernard Goetz shot four young black men
on the subway. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 44 (N.Y. 1986). Goetz claimed that he could
predict from the victims' words, conduct, and facial expressions that they were going to rob
and assault him. Id. Although he claimed self-defense, he admitted in his statement to the
police that he intended to "make them suffer as much as possible" and continued to pursue
the victims even after they tried to escape. Id. After the state's highest court reinstated
charges that a lower court had dismissed as a matter of law, a jury acquitted Goetz of the
most serious charges filed. Kirk Johnson, Goetz is Cleared in Subway Attack; Gun Count
Upheld, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1987, at Al.
107. The contrast between battered women and Bernard Goetz as beneficiaries of a
contextualized standard of reasonableness has been the subject of considerable academic
commentary. See, e.g., Armour, supra note 1, at 783; Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of
Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REV. 943, 977 (1999); Dan M. Kahan &
Kelman, supra note l; Lee, supra note 1, at 416-423; Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions
of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 332 (1996).
108. See Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, supra note 1, at 1289-90 & nn.257-59
(collecting early case cites).
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Similarly, a jury could not consider the reasonableness of a
defendant's passion without knowing the provocation that triggered it.
Instead, the controversy over reasonableness exists in a third, more
nuanced context of the objective-subjective dichotomy, which I have
described as the question of whether to consider only the objective or
also the subjective circumstances of the defendant when applying the
reasonableness standard.109 I have argued that the reasonableness
standard should be contextualized, but only by permitting the jury to
consider the objective factual circumstances surrounding the
defendant's beliefs and conduct, not the defendant's subjective
psychological peculiarities.U° For example, jurors evaluating a self
defense claim should consider relevant objective facts reasonably
believed by the defendant, such as the victim's size, threatening
posture, words, and prior conduct. In contrast, if the defendant was a
paranoid schizophrenic with delusions that an innocent victim was
threatening him, jurors should not evaluate his self-defense claim from
the perspective of a reasonable person with paranoid schizophrenia.
Applying this objective/subjective distinction, I have argued that
jurors considering the self-defense claims of battered women should
consider objective circumstances that pertain to the reasonableness of
her use of force.111 For example, they should take into account
whether the defendant previously attempted to leave the defendant,
the reasons those prior attempts were unsuccessful, prior threats made
by the victim against the defendant, prior assaults, and the relative
sizes and strengths of the defendant and victim.11 2 They should not,
however, modify the reasonableness standard subjectively by imbuing
the reasonable person with the theorized "battered woman's
syndrome," which reportedly causes battered women to perceive
imminent danger even when it is lacking and to fail to perceive escape
options even when they are available.113

109. See Burke, supra note 45, at 291.
110. Id. at 290-95. Lee argues that the defendant's attributes should be taken into
account if they relate to provoking words or conduct. For example, a defendant's
Catholicism would be relevant if the provocation was desecration of a crucifix, but not if the
provocation was the desecration of the Koran (pp. 210-12).
111. Burke, supra note 45, at 295-99. I have argued for this standard in conjunction with
a necessity standard for self-defense that does not require imminence. Id.
112. Id.
113. According to the battered woman syndrome theory, repeated, uncontrollable abuse
causes battered women to perceive their batterers as constant threats, even when the
batterers are temporarily peaceful or even sleeping. Furthermore, a condition of "learned
helplessness" renders them cognitively incapable of envisioning alternatives outside of the
relationship and developing escape skills. See generally LENORE WALKER, THE BAITERED
WOMAN 55-70 (1979) (hereinafter WALKER (1979)]; LENORE WALKER, THE BAITERED
WOMAN SYNDROME 95-104 (1984). The theory has been criticized for, among other things,
its lack of scientific support. See, e.g., David Faigman & Amy Wright, The Battered Woman
Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 109-10 (1997); David L. Faigman,
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The Role of Switching

It is within the framework of creating an objective standard of
contextualized reasonableness that I view Lee's suggestion of
switching. Lee advocates switching as a means for courts to force
jurors to confront silent biases. Looking past that immediate effect, I
see switching as a method of forcing litigants to identify objective facts
that might be relevant to the jury's inquiry, rather than using racial,
gender, or sexuality stereotypes as convenient proxies for subjective
sensitivities. Under the current regime, jurors (consciously or not) may
be relying on gender, race, and sexual orientation as subjective
qualities, using them to imbue the majority culture reasonable person
with a psychological profile that would be deemed hypersensitive in a
non-majority defendant. In contrast, switching could be used to help
jurors conjure up a hypothetical "neutral" reasonable person, whom I
define as a genderless, raceless, sexual-orientation-less reasonable
person. However, the jurors would assess the responses of the neutral
reasonable person by considering all of the relevant, objective
circumstances faced by the defendant.
Consider, for example, Lee's explanation of how switching in a
racialized-fear case would address the danger of a jury biased by "the
Black-as-Criminal stereotype" (p. 224). Because the jury would be
encouraged to picture the defendant as black and the victim as white
when assessing the defendant's reasonableness, the defendant could
not simply take for granted that the jury would silently presume
reasonableness based on race. Stated in terms of the objective
subjective dichotomy, the defendant would not enjoy a standard of
reasonableness qualified by subjective sensitivities. However, even
with race switching, "all other factors remain constant" (p. 224).
Accordingly, the defense would have an incentive to identify specific
facts that contributed to the defendant's fear, such as size differences,
a threatening stance, facial expressions, or the dark alley from which
the victim approached.
In some cases, switching the races, genders, or sexual orientations
of the actors might feel unnatural, because those character traits might
be inextricably entwined and cognitively inseparable from relevant,
objective circumstances. Lee argues that switching might be
inappropriate in such cases.11 4 However, I see switching in such cases
as a method to help the jury identify and evaluate the probative value
of the relevant, objective circumstances that render the switching
exercise unnatural.

Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72
VA. L. REV. 619, 624 (1986).
1 14. E.g.,

p.

218,

pp.

224-25.
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For example, consider Lee's analysis of switching in a case
involving a black defendant who was impassioned by racial insults. She
argues that race-switching during jury deliberations would be
inappropriate, because there is no race-switched analog for the
historical role of the N-word in demeaning and disempowering black
people (p. 225). I would argue, however, that the exercise of switching
- and the mental difficulty of achieving it - would focus the parties'
arguments and the jury's deliberations on the reasons why a black man
subjected to the N-word may be more reasonable in his passion than a
white man subjected to "honky." Race is not being used in this context
to imbue the hypothetical reasonable black person with subjective
psychological idiosyncrasies. Rather, switching is used to help jurors
envision a neutral reasonable person, placed into the context of the
objective circumstances of the historical use of the N-word and what it
represents to those subjected to it.
Similarly, consider the case of State v. Williams,115 in which a
Native-American couple was charged with homicide for failing to
obtain medical care for their infant. Although the case did not involve
a claim of self-defense or provocation, the case raised questions about
the appropriate reasonableness standard, because the defendants
argued that their decision not to call a doctor was reasonable. Use of
the defendants' Native-American culture to lower the standard of
reasonableness based on an "Indians are less rational" stereotype
would be an inappropriate, subjective use of culture. The prosecutor
might request switching to neutralize bias. On the other hand, a jury
engaged in switching might find objective, relevant facts that correlate
with the defendants' culture. Most notably, the couple argued that the
jurisdiction's extremely high displacement of Native-American
children into foster care was a legitimate consideration in determining
whether a phone call to the doctor was in the baby's best interest.11 6
Unlike a family that did not face the threat of state-enforced
separation, the Williams needed to weigh the risks of displacement
posed by calling a doctor against the health care risks posed by not
calling. With the help of switching to isolate the relevant objective
considerations, the jury could assess the Williams' culpability by
determining what the hypothetical neutral reasonable person would
have done under those circumstances.
B.

Confronting the Impact of the Neutral Reasonable Person

Employing switching to neutralize the hypothetical reasonable
person and to identify objective, relevant circumstances has at least

1 15. Williams, 484 P.2d 1 167 (Wash. 1971).
1 16. Id.
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two implications that Lee does not discuss. First, if switching is
employed in all cases, as I suggest it should be, then it will be more
difficult for all defendants, not just the white, heterosexual, male ones,
to invoke silent stereotypes. Second, defendants seeking to soften the
impact of switching by pointing to objective, relevant circumstances
may seek to recharacterize stereotypes as objective truths. In this
Section, I address those implications in tum.
1.

Battered Women: The Unaddressed Cases

Lee claims that her primary goal is to achieve equality in the
assertion of criminal defenses. She makes her case for reform by
focusing primarily on cases involving unsympathetic majority culture
defendants who successfully invoke claims of reasonableness in female
infidelity, gay panic, and racialized-fear cases. Having used case
narratives in an attempt to persuade readers that change is needed,
she then builds her suggestions for reform with an eye toward making
it more difficult for these undeserving defendants to avoid conviction.
However, she does not seek to explain how these reforms would apply
to cases other than the ones she finds troubling. In other words, while
she criticizes the benefit conferred upon white, heterosexual, male
defendants by dominant social norms, she appears reluctant to force
more sympathetic defendants to forego advantages that might be
conferred upon them by stereotyping.
Most notably, Lee could do more to explain whether or how
"switching" should apply to cases involving battered women. As a
means of ensuring an objective standard of reasonableness, I would
advocate switching in battered woman cases to prevent jurors from
applying gendered stereotypes of helplessness and passivity and to
encourage jurors and litigants to focus on the objective circumstances
surrounding the defendant's decision to kill.117 In some battered
woman cases, the unnaturalness of the hypothetical switch might call
attention to objective facts that support the defendant's decision to
use force.118 For example, consider a woman in Judy Norman's
situation, who kills her husband after years of abuse, failed attempts to
leave, and under his threat that the next time she tries to leave him, he
will kill her.119 In a case involving a lengthy history of severe abuse and
a defendant's failed attempts to escape, switching may feel unnatural

117. A common complaint is that battered woman syndrome relies on stereotypes of
helplessness that do not describe all battered women. See infra note 124.
118. See supra Section IIl.A.2 for my argument that a juror's difficulty envisioning the
same facts while switching might indicate the relevance of objective facts that are
inseparable from the switched character trait.
119. See supra note 69 and accompanying text for a summary of State
S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).

v.

Norman, 378
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to jurors. D etermining the source of that discomfort would require
jurors and litigants to focus on the continual abuse and the lack of the
defendant's nonfatal alternatives, objective circumstances that pertain
to the beliefs and conduct of a hypothetical neutral reasonable person
in the defendant's situation. Jurors would not, however, give direct
consideration to the defendant's gender and the stereotypes that might
accompany it.
Used in the manner I suggest, switching would not benefit all
women who claim self-defense.1 20 One of the two cases that Lee was
able to locate that involved switching1 21 was one I tried as a domestic
violence prosecutor, in which I used a switching exercise during
closing arguments to convict a female defendant who had claimed self
defense (p. 219). The defendant was a young, white, attractive, upper
middle-class woman who had thrown a hot cup of tea on her boyfriend
during an argument. The conduct, although minor, was sufficient to
violate the misdemeanor statutes in a jurisdiction with a "zero
tolerance" approach to domestic violence. Although I could have
dismissed the case if I believed the defendant's self-defense claim, the
defendant did not point to any objective evidence of the victim's
violence or threat of violence. Her only explanation for throwing the
tea was so the victim would move away from her during an argument
about money he had spent from the household budget.
Fearing that the jury would acquit the defendant because they saw
the incident as minor, rather than because of a legitimate self-defense
claim, I asked the jurors to engage in a thought exercise that had
convinced me to try the case, despite an initial desire to dismiss it. I
asked them to imagine that the defendant was a man yelling at his wife
for buying a scarf at Nordstrom they could not afford, then throwing
his soup on her so she would get away from him. The jury convicted
after forty minutes of deliberation.
Although Lee appears to cite a trial experience like mine as an
example of when switching might be used by a prosecutor to highlight
a female defendant's unreasonable claim of self-defense,1 2 2 her
recalcitrance to embrace the full ramifications of switching in all cases
is patent. Even in the introduction of the book, she prepares the
120. As I have argued in previous work, shifting to an objective standard of
reasonableness from a subjective standard that permits the use of the battered woman
syndrome would make it more difficult for some battered women to claim self-defense. See
Burke, supra note 45, at 295-96.
121. Based on my own trial experience, I suspect that the exercise might be considerably
more common than either Lee or I can evidence, at least as a rhetorical device during
attorneys' arguments. However, because of the nature of how cases are reported and
documented, it is difficult to determine how frequently switching-like arguments are made
without ever being the subject of judicial decision, let alone a written and reported one.
122. See p. 219 (leading into the example by explaining, "[g]ender-switching may be
necessary to highlight the unreasonableness of a female defendant's claim of self-defense").
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reader for the absence of the discussion by distancing her work from
the "rich and developed literature about battered women," making
clear that she does not "purport to add to" it (p. 6). Viewed within the
broader literature on reasonableness, Lee's failure to explore the
ramifications of her reforms for the literature's most discussed group
of cases is a conspicuous shortcoming. She justifies the lack of
attention to battered women cases by explaining that her focus is on
cases in which defendants rely on dominant social norms to bolster
claims of reasonableness; battered women, in contrast, "often need to
introduce expert testimony to dispel common misperceptions about
battered women" (p. 6).
However, even if Lee is interested solely in cases in which
dominant social norms are manipulated, I question her assumption
that these cases will involve only majority culture defendants. Some
have argued that the battered woman syndrome dispels the old myths
about battered women1 23 by replacing them with stereotypes based on
female helplessness, a dominant social norm.1 24 Additionally, Lee
herself notes that female defendants in spousal murder cases receive
shorter prison sentences upon conviction than men who kill their
wives.1 25 Perhaps battered women as a class are not generally invoking
dominant social norms about women, but there must be at least some
women who are, and Lee should concede that her proposals might
affect them.
123. Widely credited with the identification of the battered woman syndrome,
psychologist Lenore Walker has listed a group of "myths" that collectively perpetuate the
erroneous belief that domestic violence victims are responsible for their own abuse. For
example, Walker's early work suggested that people commonly believed that domestic
violence was rare, affected only some demographic groups, and largely occurred against
victims who enjoyed the abuse. See WALKER (1979), supra note 113, at 18-31 (1979); see also
Charles Patrick Ewing & Moss Aubrey, Battered Women and Public Opinion: Some Realities
About the Myths, 2 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 257, 261 tbl.1 (1987) (reporting that more than forty
percent of people surveyed believed a wife who did not leave an abusive marriage was a
masochist). Social science research indicates that the myths are changing. For example,
young people tend to be more knowledgeable about the realities of domestic violence than
previous generations. See Mary Dodge & Edith Greene, Juror and Expert Conceptions of
Battered Women, 6 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 271, 278-81 (1991) (reporting that the youngest
group of subjects surveyed was the most knowledgeable about battered women, while the
oldest group was the least knowledgeable). See generally Stephen J. Morse, Rationality and
Responsibility, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 251, 314 (2000) (summarizing social science research
indicating that the general public has become more knowledgeable about domestic
violence).
124. See Mary Becker, The Passions of Battered Women: Cognitive Links Between
Passion, Empathy, and Power, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 8-11 (2001) (describing
stereotypes that disadvantage battered women); Elaine Chiu, Confronting the Agency in
Battered Mothers, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1249- 50 (2001) (noting that the battered woman
syndrome describes a "narrowly defined persona" that is not indicative of many battered
women); Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A
Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1196 (1995) ("The
psychological realities of battered women do not fit a singular profile - in fact, they vary
considerably from each other.").
125. P. 27 (citing Department of Justice figures).
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Finally, even if Lee were willing to leave the impact of her reforms
on battered women outside the scope of her project, one would expect
her to ignore the battered woman cases entirely, leaving it to others to
speculate how her reforms should play out in that context. Instead,
Lee offers a tentative answer, suggesting that switching should not
necessarily occur in cases involving battered women. She worries that
jurors switching in battered woman cases "might simply apply the
usual standard - that of the reasonable or ordinary man" (p. 220).
The "solution," she maintains, is that an attorney who represents a
battered woman should be permitted to file a motion in limine,
arguing that switching is inappropriate because a man would be
unlikely to have suffered the defendant's history of physical and
psychological abuse (p. 220). Only when such a motion fails, Lee
states, should the court instruct the jury to switch genders, holding all
other facts constant (p. 220).
Lee's suggestion that there are some cases when switching is
inappropriate, even when all other objective facts are held constant
and can be considered relevant by the jury, is at best confusing. At
worst, it undermines Lee's call for equality by suggesting an
unwillingness to apply her own reforms when they do not serve her
admittedly "progressive" politics (p. 4). Lee does little to prevent the
latter impression when she states without explanation in a footnote
that she believes it is "generally appropriate" for courts to instruct
jurors to compare female defendants who are domestic violence
victims to the "reasonable battered woman" (p. 332 n.31), a position
that is difficult to reconcile with other statements she makes about the
objective nature of reasonableness. She agrees, for example, that
defendants with paranoid schizophrenia should not be compared to
average paranoid schizophrenics (p. 210). She further concedes that at
least some components of the battered woman syndrome describe a
mental condition going beyond the woman's physical experience.126
She even acknowledges that others have "argued persuasively" that
battered woman syndrome should not be used to qualify
reasonableness because it purports to describe a condition causing a
misperception of reality (p. 332 n.31). Lee's adamance about retaining
the current regime of battered woman syndrome, in light of those
observations, at least appears worthy of explanation.
I have argued in contrast that switching should be used in all cases
as a method of creating a genderless, raceless, sexual-orientation-less
neutral reasonable person. Used in the battered woman cases, this
neutral standard of reasonableness, contextualized by objective
126. Lee states that "abuse is not so much a physical attribute of the female defendant
as something she has experienced. Expert testimony on battered woman syndrome is often
presented to suggest that the abused woman suffers from something akin to post-traumatic
stress disorder, a mental condition." Id.
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circumstances, would help distinguish between defendants whose
circumstances supported a reasonable belief that self-defense was
necessary, and those whose did not. Most importantly, this neutral,
objective approach to reasonableness, when coupled with flexible,
nondiscriminatory legal standards, is consistent with the vision of
equality that Lee describes.
2.

Depiction of Stereotypes as Objective Truths

A second implication of switching is that defendants might seek to
recharacterize stereotypes as objective truths that should be taken into
account when imagining the hypothetical neutral reasonable person in
the defendant's circumstances. Lee appears not to anticipate this
strategy, perhaps because her work assumes that stereotypes are
inappropriate for juror consideration and focuses instead on the
puzzling question of how to prevent silent consideration of them.
However, if Lee is correct in her claim that defendants in female
infidelity, gay panic, and racialized-fear cases currently benefit from
silent biases, those same defendants might seek to reap similar
benefits under her suggested regime by speaking those stereotypes
aloud as alleged facts.127
Lee, for example, assumes that jurors in a racialized-fear case can
neutralize the "black-as-criminal" stereotype by envisioning the case
with a black defendant and a white victim. Because "all other factors
remain constant," she explains, the jury should still consider facts
about the defendant that might correlate with dangerousness, like size,
clothing, and location. However, Lee does not address what a court
should do if the white defendant facing such a jury instruction argues
that the victim's race was in fact relevant to his belief that he posed a
danger. He might even seek to buttress him claim by introducing
evidence of the disproportionately high arrest and conviction rates
found among black males.128 Similarly, in gay panic cases, heterosexual
defendants might seek to counter the effects of switching by arguing
that the homosexual victim who made the unwanted sexual advance
was larger, stronger, and more aggressive than the hypothetical
woman that the switching jury might otherwise envision. In female

127. Lee's failure to address how switching should be implemented in such cases is
especially notable given her concession that gender and race might be relevant traits when
invoked by battered women who kill in self-defense or by black defendants provoked by
racial insults. See supra for a summary of Lee's analysis of battered woman and racial insult
cases. If female and minority defendants are permitted to invoke their identity traits as
relevant, white, male, and heterosexual defendants will certainly do the same.
128. Jody Armour has coined the term "intelligent Bayesian" to describe the person
who defends his fear of blacks by pointing to statistical data about criminality. See JODY
DAYID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF
BEING BLACK IN AMERICA (1997).
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infidelity cases, male defendants might argue that spousal infidelity is
more shaming to a man than to a woman, precisely because of the
history reflected in the common law provocation doctrine - an
argument similar to the one that Lee sets forth for black defendants
provoked by racial insults.
These "but the stereotypes are true" claims are deeply troubling
but nevertheless unavoidable if switching is adopted. Under Lee's
approach to switching, the defendant could raise the claim in the form
of a motion in limine to avoid switching, similar to the motions that
Lee would permit battered women to file.129 If battered women are
allowed to argue, "don't switch because here my gender matters,"
majority-culture defendants will make similar arguments about their
own characteristics. Even if switching were used in all cases under my
alternative suggestion, a defendant could still present a "stereotypes
are true" claim by arguing that the factor allegedly correlating with
race, gender, or sexual orientation was an objective one that should
remain constant during the switching exercise.
Lee decries this kind of "stereotypes are true" reasoning,
compellingly demonstrating the unhelpfulness of statistics in justifying
stereotypes. For example, she notes that the majority of black men in
the criminal justice system are there for nonviolent drug offenses.130
She also notes that, while black men are over-represented in the
population of violent arrests, men are also more likely to be arrested
for violent crime when compared to women.131 Nevertheless, she
argues, no one infers from the country's disproportionately male rate
of violence that it is reasonable to fear "all men" (pp. 146-47).
However, it is one thing to argue a reasonable fear of all members of a
group based on disproportionately high representation among arrests,
and quite another to argue that the group characteristic is a reasonable
factor to consider. Moreover, even if Lee disagrees with a statistical
determination that a group characteristic (e.g. , race) is a sufficient
correlate of the fact at issue (e.g. , dangerousness), these are the kinds
of fact determinations that are generally left to the jury.
I concede that I am troubled by the specter of jurors deliberating
over whether race is reasonably considered in assessing
dangerousness, whether sexual orientation is reasonably considered in
assessing sexual aggressiveness, and whether gender is reasonably
considered in assessing the impact of infidelity. Despite that
1 29. See supra for a summary of Lee's suggested motion in limine
cases and the purported justifications for it.

in

battered woman

130. Pp. 146-47 (quoting MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK
MEN AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A GROWING NATIONAL PROBLEM 9, 14 (1990)).
131. Id. (quoting MAUER, supra note 130, at 14; FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1999: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 234
(2000)).
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discomfort, I am willing to accept those deliberations as an inevitable
consequence of a neutral, objective standard of reasonableness. As an
initial matter, Lee makes a compelling argument that jurors are
already relying on the stereotypes that these statistical arguments
evoke. Forcing litigants to introduce the stereotypes as true would at
least put what I believe to be faulty myths to the test of litigation.
Moreover, if a defendant raised a "stereotypes are true" claim, at
least his reliance on race, gender, or sexual orientation would be
opaque. Forcing the defendant to speak aloud the stereotype he relies
on is an advantage over the current use of silent social norms. As Lee
notes, social science literature on bias suggests that people are more
likely to suppress their natural, biased instincts when stereotypes are
made salient.132 Furthermore, individual jurors in the defendant's case
might not even share the dominant bias that the defendant seeks to
invoke; the result of his claim, therefore, may be to bias the offended
jurors against him. The likelihood of jury backlash increases as
dominant social norms change over time. For example, Lee notes that
the American view of male jealousy is shifting from an expression of
love toward a sign of immaturity.133 Because of these strategic risks,
the possibility that imposing a neutral, objective reasonableness
standard will transform criminal prosecutions into trials about race,
gender, and sexual orientation seems unlikely.
CONCLUSION

Murder and the Reasonable Man is an important contribution to
the existing literature on reasonableness. Lee's most significant
achievement is her pulling together of three very different kinds of
cases to make a single, compelling showing that the current standard
of reasonableness permits majority culture defendants to benefit from
dominant social norms that minority culture defendants do not enjoy.
For lay readers, Lee's thoughtful but accessible use of theory in
practical ways will frame the pop culture notion of "abuse excuse" in a
different light. For academics, Lee broadens the basis for discussing
familiar questions of reasonableness by demonstrating that the
theoretical debate has consequences for defendants other than
battered women and Bernard Goetz. By drawing upon both self
defense and provocation cases, and by using cases involv
ing majority culture defendants, Lee shows that stereotypes can

132. See Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break
the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 760-61 (1995) (discussing social science studies on
racial bias).
133. P. 66; see PETER N. STEARNS, JEALOUSY: THE EVOLUTION OF AN EMOTION IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 21 (1989); Paul E. Mullen, Jealousy: The Pathology of Passion, 158
BRIT. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 593, 594 (1991).
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affect jury decisionmaking whenever reasonableness is part of the
doctrinal landscape.
I have tried to situate Lee's suggestions for reform in the broader
theoretical picture of a neutral, objective standard of reasonableness
standard. The gap, for example, that troubles Lee between act
reasonableness and emotion reasonableness can be attributed to the
common law's reliance on rules that tended to reflect biased values. A
move toward the use of more flexible standards in both the self
defense and provocation contexts, I have argued, is one step toward
achieving more neutral defenses.
Once the applicable legal doctrines have been neutralized, Lee's
suggestion of switching can be seen as a device to control for silent
biases that might affect the law's application in individual cases.
Switching would help jurors envision the hypothetical neutral
reasonable person, without gender, race, or sexual orientation. At the
same time, tackling their intuitive responses to switching would help
them isolate the objective circumstances that should be considered
when placing the neutral reasonable person in the defendant's shoes, a
task that has troubled courts and scholars since the emergence of the
battered woman self-defense cases.
Even readers who do not view Lee's recommendations through a
theoretical lens will be drawn to Lee's suggestions as practical
solutions to the complicated social norms problem she has identified.
Lee closes her work by acknowledging that legal reform cannot solve
all problems and cannot . directly shape social beliefs. Her hope, she
writes, is that the book "will encourage people to think more critically
about what constitutes reasonable violence and the notion of
reasonableness as it is used in the criminal law" (p. 278). Lee's
narrative of cases alone is sufficiently troubling, powerful, and
convincing to accomplish her goal. However, Lee goes further, making
a significant contribution to the literature by raising new problems
about reasonableness and, despite some concerns noted in this review,
making notable headway in addressing the flaws she identifies.

